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To Divide or Not to Divide the Community Interest in




In the wake of the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Hare v.
Hodgins, at least one court of appeal2 has applied one of the modi-
fications made by the Hare case in the valuation3 and division of the
"community" interest in a pension plan. Last year in this symposium
the author speculated about the dictum in Hare permitting new flexibility
to a trial judge in "dividing interests in pension benefits that are not
yet matured." '4 The Hare case involved matured pension benefits. How-
ever, by repudiating certain language in Sims v. Sims,s which applied
the "fixed percentage" method of "dividing" the "community" interest
in unmatured pension benefits, the Louisiana Supreme Court signaled
a conscious departure from the Sims decision even in cases where the
pension benefits have not yet matured. The court's subsequent remand
in Frazier v. Harper,6 involving a "community" interest in unmatured
pension benefits, supports this conclusion. In Frazier; the court, reversed
the judgment below and remanded the case to the trial court, instructing
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REviaw.
* Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, LSU Law Center.
1. 586 So. 2d 118 (La. 1991). Subsequent litigation involving the same parties appears
at 601 So. 2d 665 (La. 1992) where motion filed to enforce court's order issued in decision
at 586 So. 2d 118 (La. 1991). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the order, remanded
to the trial court, and ordered it "to act immediately to provide interim relief to relator;
and . . . to render a decision on the merits within forty-five days." 601 So. 2d 665 (La.
1992). See also Hodgins v. Hodgins, 604 So. 2d 991 (La. 1992).
2. Halverson v. Halverson, 589 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writ denied,
600 So. 2d 655 (La. 1992), discussed infra in text at notes 72-92.
3. One of the two profound issues was the valuation of the community interest in
a pension plan by a fixed percentage formula without permitting evidence that post-
termination increases in the pension benefits were due to "personal effort or achievement
after termination of the community that has little or no relationship with the prior
community." Hare, 586 So. 2d at 128.
4. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in the Law, 1990-1991, 52
La. L. Rev. 655, 667 (1992).
5. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
6. 600 So. 2d 59 (La. 1992).
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the trial judge to "decide the case according to the principles set forth
in La. R.S. 9:2801 [community property partition statute] and our
decisions in the present case, Hare v. Hodgins, Sims v. Sims, and T.L.
James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery."7
An examination of the post-Hare jurisprudence reveals no apparent
reluctance by the courts of appeal to apply new methods of division of
pension benefits-i.e., the "present cash value" method-where there
is some form of immediate transfer to the non-employee spouse.8 The
judiciary should be cautious in its approach to the problem of the
disposition of unmatured pension benefits in a community property
partition. Abandoning the rigidity in application of the Sims "fixed
percentage" method permits the court to seek individual justice (equity
for both spouses), but at what cost? 9 Equity in the form of equal justice
for both spouses may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
I. SiMS V. SIMS DECISION
The Sims decision was the seminal caseI0 in Louisiana establishing
the method of valuation and division of the "community" interest in
7. Id. at 63 (citations omitted).
8. "[Under] the 'present cash value method,' ... the court determines the com-
munity' interest in the pension, figures the present cash value of that interest, and awards
half of that amount to the non-employee spouse in a lump sum, usually in the form of
equivalent property ..... " Johnson v. Johnson, 638 P.2d 705, 708 (1981) (footnote omitted),
cited in Elizabeth Alford Beskin, Comment, Retirement Equity Inaction: Division of
Pension Benefits Upon Divorce in Louisiana, 48 La. L. Rev. 677, 681 (1988).
9. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law
and Succession Law, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1165, 1166 (1986): "But as Richard Epstein has
pointed out, the aim of perfect, individualized justice often turns out to be an illusion,
while the social cost of trying to achieve it, as well as the cost to individual litigants, is
high.
In part this tendency [toward substantive justice] is justified by the belief
that this fine tuning is necessary in order to eliminate individual acts of injustice
that are not caught by the general rules. But that hope is often delusive. Any
refinement in legal rules will increase their error in application as well as their
costs of administration; at some point the benefits of precision are overwhelmed
by their costs. Perfect justice can only be done at an infinite price-which is
another way of saying that it cannot be done at all. A willingness to entertain
some tradeoff between simplicity and aspiration is not only the counsel of
prudence, it is also a precondition for justice in the broad run of cases. Epstein,
Settlement and Litigation: Of Vices Individual and Institutional, 30 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Rec. 2, 5 (1984) (footnote omitted).
10. It was the seminal case in part because it modified the earlier Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
In Sims, the court carefully distinguished between "defined contributions plan," such as
that in T. L. James, and "defined benefits plans," such as that in Sims. Sims v. Sims,
358 So. 2d 919, 923 n.5 (La. 1978). See also Dian Tooley Arruebarrena, Applying
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a spouse's pension plan. As was typical of many of Justice Albert Tate's
opinions, he used the language of the opinion to instruct. First, Justice
Tate observed that because of the nature of the interest acquired by
the "community," it was not merchantable or subject to "partition by
licitation,""t although admittedly it was subject to voluntary partition. 12
Justice Tate described the nature of the interest acquired by the "com-
munity" in the following terms: "Until the employee is separated from
the service, dies, retires, or becomes disabled, no value can be fixed
upon his right to receive an annuity or upon lump-sum payments or
other benefits to be paid on his account."' 3 Later in the opinion, Justice
Tate expressed his concern with the speculative nature of any present
valuation assigned to the unmatured pension benefits in a footnote:
"Deferring the actual valuation until distribution to the annuitant sub-
stantially increases the chance that the numerous variables which affect
the ultimate pension will then be taken into account.' 1 4 Reading both
statements together, it seems obvious that Justice Tate did not mean
literally that no value can be fixed upon the non-employee spouse's
interest in the other spouse's pension. He observed that the more var-
iables affecting the pension in the form of unfulfilled 5 resolutory con-
ditions,1 6 the greater the speculation as to the value and the greater
possibility of injustice to the employee spouse.
Louisiana's Community Property Principles to Pensions, 33 Loy. L. Rev. 241 (1987). The
court recognized the feature of "gradual vesting" common in defined benefits plans. Sims,
358 So. 2d at 925 appendix A. See Gerald LeVan, Allocating Deferred Compensation in
Louisiana, 38 La. L. Rev. 35, 45 (1977), cited in Sims, 358 So. 2d at 924 n.5. The court
also established the accompanying principle that the non-employee spouse is entitled only
to a judgment recognizing his or her interest in the other spouse's pension if and when
payable. Sims, 358 So. 2d at 923-24.
It. "Due to the nature of the interest acquired by the community, as these decisions
likewise recognize, it is not merchantable or susceptible to partition by licitation." Sims,
358 So. 2d at 923 (footnote omitted).
12. "Of course, the parties between themselves can agree upon a valuation for purposes
of conventional partition." Id.
13. Id. at 923 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 924 n.7 (emphasis added). In the footnote, Justice Tate cites Vester T.
Hughes, Jr., Community-Property Aspects of Profit-Sharing and Pension Plans in Texas-
Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 860, 880-
81 (1966).
15. La Civ. Code art. 1774 provides:
If the condition is that an event shall not occur within a fixed time, it is
considered as fulfilled once that time has elapsed without the event having
occurred.
The condition is regarded as fulfilled whenever it is certain that the event
will not occur, whether or not a time has been fixed.
16. Professor Gerald LeVan characterizes the conditions attached to the employer's
promise to pay pension benefits as resolutory, rather than suspensive as the Louisiana
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Justice Tate analogized the judgment declaring the non-employee's
interest in the pension plan, if and when the benefits became due in
the future, 17 to a "partition or division in kind."' 8 Of course, there is
no actual partition in kind.' 9 The judgment recognizing a non-employee
spouse's proportionate interest in a community asset merely fixes for
the first time the percentage owned by each spouse in the asset which
continues to be co-owned. The former community asset remains under
the exclusive control of one of the co-owners by virtue of his relationship
with his employer.20 Typically, Justice Tate recognized the significant
difference between a partition in kind of pension benefits and the
judgment recognizing the percentages of ownership of the employee and
non-employee spouses in the former's pension benefits. In a footnote
in the Sims opinion, he imposed upon the employee spouse the duty
to exercise his control of the co-owned asset in "good faith."',
The Sims case carefully balanced the interest of the employee spouse
against that of the non-employee spouse in devising the method of
valuation and division of unmatured pension benefits. In the case of
the employee spouse, Sims provided that the non-employee spouse's
interest in his pension and the value of that interest would be subject
Supreme Court held in T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La.
1976). See LeVan, supra note 10, at 40-41 n.14.
A resolutory condition is defined as follows: "If the obligation may be immediately
enforced but will come to an end when the uncertain event occurs, the condition is
resolutory." La. Civ. Code art. 1767. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1774 and 1775.
17. Nevertheless, under the decisions cited, the wife is entitled to a declaration
at this time of the interest attributable to the community of any such payments,
if and when they become due in the future.... When the community is
dissolved, the non-employed spouse is entitled to have recognized his or her
one-half interest in this community asset, i.e., the right to receive payments
from employee benefit plans, to the extent (proportion) that these payments
result from the employment or contributions during the community.
See Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 923 (La. 1978).
18. Id.
19. La. Civ. Code art. 810 now defines a partition in kind as follows:
The court shall decree partition in kind when the thing held in indivision is
susceptible to division into as many lots of nearly equal value as there are
shares and the aggregate value of all lots is not significantly lower than the
value of the property in the state of indivision.
(Added by 1990 La. Acts No. 990, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1991) (emphasis added). The comment
to Article 810 (1991) explains that it merely restates La. Civ. Code art. 1340 (1870) (see
infra note 22) and "does not change the law."
20. His relationship with his employer may be by contract or by statute (which
authorize numerous state and federal pension plans).
21. "At present, the community's retirement-plan interest, as yet inchoate, is in
annuities or lump-sum payments to become payable in the future, as determined by the
husband's good-faith election of options available to him or by his death, separation from
service, or involuntary retirement." Sims, 358 So. 2d at 923 n.4 (emphasis added).
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to the same contingencies as the employee's own interest. Against the
interest of the employee, Sims balanced the interest of the non-employee
spouse in protecting her ownership interest in the other spouse's pension
from spiteful, and even negligent, decisions made by the employee. This
balance of interests was artfully achieved and articulated, and served
the profession well.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTORY CHANGEs AFTER SIMS
The Louisiana statutory scheme of partition at the time of Sims
precluded traditional judicial partition of unmatured pension benefits. 2
The articles regulating partition in kind prevented an allocation of dif-
ferent assets in their entirety to one spouse to accomplish a partition.
Under the Louisiana Civil Code articles, partition in kind could only
be utilized if each item was subject to division in kind (the "item"
theory).23 By contrast, other jurisdictions recognized the "aggregate"
theory of partition, or division of co-owned assets,u which permitted
the judge to consider the property to be divided as the aggregate of
co-owned property and to allocate or assign the assets to accomplish
the division. If the property could not be partitioned in kind, the Civil
Code articles required partition by licitation accomplished by public sale
of the property.2
Even though at least one author predicted legislation addressing the
division and valuation of pension benefits after the T. L. James deci-
sion,26 there was none, probably because of satisfaction with the formula
22. La. Civ. Code art. 1339 (1870) provides: "When the property is indivisible by
its nature . . ., the judge shall order, at the instance of any one of the heirs, on proof
of either of these facts, that it be sold at public auction, after the time of notice and
advertisements prescribed by law, and in the manner hereinafter prescribed." (repealed
by 1991 La. Acts No. 689, § 1).
La. Civ. Code art. 1340 (1870) provides: "It is said that a thing can not be
conveniently divided, when a diminution of its value, or loss or inconvenience of one of
the owners, would be the consequence of dividing it." (repealed by 1991 La. Acts No.
689, § 1).
23. La. Civ. Code arts. 1339-40 (1870), text in supra note 22. See La. Civ. Code
arts. 810-811 (1991), which do not represent a change in the law.
See discussion in Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in the
Law, 1981-1982, 43 La. L. Rev. 513 (1982). See also Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee
Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, § 7.25, in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989).
24. See Spaht, supra note 23.
25. La. Civ. Code arts. 1339-40 (1870). For text of the two articles, see supra note
22.
26. LeVan, supra note 10, at 47:
Proposed legislation withdrawing all retirement benefits from the operation of
forced heirship was adopted almost unanimously by the Council of the Law
Institute but its recommendation to the Legislature was deferred. The Council
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devised in Sims, decided just two years after T.L. James. However, in
1982 the legislature did enact a comprehensive partition statute for former
community property adopting the "aggregate" theory of partition.27
After January 1, 1983, a trial judge had authority to partition former
community property by allocating or assigning assets to one spouse or
the other and accomplishing an equal division in an equitable manner.
For the first time, assignment of the "community" interest in a pension
to the employee spouse and community property of equal value to the
non-employee spouse was possible, assuming the interest was susceptible
of valuation.
Subsequent to enactment of Louisiana's new partition statute, Con-
gress enacted the Retirement Equity Act (REA), 21 amending the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).29 The avowed purpose
of the REA was to
improve the delivery of retirement benefits and provide for
greater equity under private pension plans for workers and their
spouses ... by taking into account changes in work patterns,
the status of marriage as an economic partnership, and the
substantial contribution to that partnership of spouses who work
both in and outside the home .... 10
In a student comment analyzing the impact of the REA upon Louisiana
decisions involving division of pension benefits, the author recommended
that in the case of tax-qualified private pension plans" judges should
assign "a value to plan benefits at the time of divorce ' 3 2 and direct
an "immediate transfer" of the non-employee spouse's interest to him
or her.
An "immediate transfer" can be accomplished in two different ways:
(1) the court can recognize the non-employee spouse "as an alternate
also approved but again deferred for submission to the Legislature valuation
and allocation provisions quite similar to those above recommended. [elsewhere
in the article; ultimately incorporated in the Sims case] ... It is likely that
similar legislation will be proposed in the near future.
27. La. R.S. 9:2801 (1991). See Spaht, supra note 23, for a discussion of the statute
after its enactment. See also Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 23
28. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
29. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974).
30. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
31. I.R.C. § 401(a) (West Supp. 1992).
32. Beskin, supra note 8, at 695. According to the author, the practice of recognizing
the ability to assign a present value to pension benefits began in Taylor v. Taylor, 473
So. 2d 867 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) and in King v. King, 493 So. 2d 679 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1986). t,
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payee pursuant to a QDRO3 3 by the pension administrator ' 3 4 and the
administrator can separate the interest of the non-employee spouse and
place it in a separate account subject to the election of benefit options
by the non-employee spouse35 ; or (2) the court can recognize "the non-
employee spouse's right to immediately receive the full value of her
pension benefit" 36 permitting the non-employee to make "a tax-free
rollover of the distribution to her own qualified plan ' 37 "within her
own control . . . as manager . . . of the pension fund." 3 If the judge
should choose the former method of "immediate transfer," the author
of the student comment suggests that he can further protect the non-
employee spouse from the premature death of the employee spouse39 by
stipulating in the QDRO "that an ex-wife be entitled to that portion
of the husband's survivor annuity or death benefit earned during the
community as calculated by application of the Sims formula." 40
Both state and federal statutes enacted after the Sims decision permit
greater flexibility in dividing the "community" interest in unmatured
pension benefits. If there is an appropriate case, the trial judge may
assign a value to the non-employee spouse's interest and either allocate
other community property to satisfy that interest or utilize the REA to
sever the non-employee's interest in the pension from that of the em-
ployee by one of the two methods of "immediate transfer." Identification
of the appropriate case after weighing both the interests of the employee
33. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) is
a domestic relations order "made pursuant to a state domestic relations law
(including a community property law)" which "creates or recognizes the existence
of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to,
receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant
under a plan" and relates to the provision of "alimony payments, or marital
property rights to a spouse, [or] former spouse. ... "
Beskin, supra note 8, at 683-84 (footnotes omitted). See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)()
and (ii)(l),(II) (West Supp. 1992).
34. Beskin, supra note 8, at 695. The authority cited for this statement of the author
was 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(16)(A),(B) (West Supp. 1987).
35. Beskin, supra note 8, at 695. "Her options are still predicated, however, on the
rights of the participant."
36. Id. at 696.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. In re Succession of Sims, 464 So. 2d 991 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985), the sequel
to the original Sims decision discussed in the text of this article at supra notes 8-19, the
husband had died prior to the maturity of pension benefits (the time the benefits became
payable). "The court denied the ex-spouse an interest in Mr. Sims' survivor annuity,
awarding her instead a return of one-half of the employee contributions made to the plan
during the existence of the community. Mr. Sims' spouse of four years (at the date of
death) is receiving the survivor annuity." Beskin, supra note 8, at 687.
40. Beskin, supra note 8, at 698. See also 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(F)(i) (West Supp.
1992).
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and non-employee spouse remains elusive. Obviously, the flexibility in
partitioning the unmatured pension benefits introduced by the partition
statute and the REA focuses on the interest of the non-employee spouse.
Nonetheless, there also may be interests of the employee spouse to
consider 41 in deciding if present valuation of the non-employee spouse's
interest in unmatured pension benefits ["present cash value" method]
is preferable to a judgment declaring the spouse's respective interests if
and when the benefits are payable ["reserved jurisdiction" or "fixed
percentage" method].
III. HARE v. HODGINS DECISION
The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately repudiated the lower courts'
rigid adherence to the formula devised for division of pensions in T.
L. James and Sims. The court described the formula of the two decisions
as having "become enshrined as a pension doctrine." 42 Even though the
pension benefits in Hare v.Hodgins43 were fully matured, the rationale,
elaborating upon the ambiguities of the Sims decision, supports the
application of Hare to unmatured benefits as well." The court described
the statement from the Sims case that no value can be fixed upon the
right of an employee to receive pension benefits as "unfortunate. ' 4
41. There are two potential types of costs involved in segregating the non-
employee spouse's interest. REA provides for charging the "account" of a
participant and the non-employee spouse with the costs involved in calculating
and segregating the benefit. The greater potential cost to the plan results if
excess benefits have been distributed to the non-employee spouse. Such a situation
could occur if one-half of a participant's benefit is distributed to the non-
employee spouse and then part of the participant's benefit is forfeited pursuant
to a "bad boy" clause .... In essence, courts have the opportunity to allocate
the risk of an excess payment to either the pension plan or to the non-employee
spouse. It seems that the pension plan is in a much better position to bear that
risk."
Beskin, supra note 8, at 697-98 (footnote omitted).
42. Beskin, supra note 8, at 678.
43. 586 So. 2d 118 (La. 1991).
44. See Hargrave, supra note 4, at 667. In a subsection of the article entitled The
Dicta, the author opined, "Justice Dennis' opinion also suggests that greater flexibility
is also available to the trial judge when dividing interests in pension benefits that are not
yet matured." See also language quoted from the opinion in Hare in infra note 45.
45. Hare, 586 So. 2d at 126:
If it was intended to signify that the employer could not be required to pay
benefits until due under its contractual obligation, the statement was correct
but ambiguous. But if it was meant to indicate that a pension right could not
be valuated for purposes of voluntary [actually the court recognized the possibility
of valuing the interest for a voluntary partition] or judicial partition prior to
maturity the statement must be acknowledged as error.
(Emphasis added.)
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Furthermore, in describing the formulation of the holding in Sims, the
Hare court referred to the significance of the language "if and when
they become due in the future" as follows: "[W]e did not say that the
fixed percentage method is the only technique that may be applied to
divide pension benefits." 46
In a subsequent part of the opinion the Louisiana Supreme Court
further "clarifies" its decision in Sims by permitting the employee spouse
to introduce evidence to modify the "community fraction" by proof
that post-divorce increases to pension benefits are due to "high separate
earnings in the employee spouse's late employment years." '4 7 The em-
ployee spouse bears the burden of "going forward with evidence and
of persuasion. . . ."4 The ability to fine-tune the "community fraction"
afforded to the employee spouse "may be more illusive than real,"1
4 9
whereas the, decision actually "is much more favorable to the non-
covered spouse under the Hare facts . . . [it] allows that spouse to share
in the investment income and inflationary increases in value of such
intangible rights." 5
46. Id..
Neither the Civil Code nor La. R.S. 9:2801 contains anything that requires
courts to follow the fixed percentage method to the exclusion of others. In
fact, La. R.S. 9:2801, which was enacted subsequent to Sims affords the par-
titioning tribunal a great deal of flexibility and clearly implies that the goals
of equality and equity require that no one method should be used to the exclusion
of other apportionment techniques. Moreover, our study of legal developments
both here and in other jurisdictions convinces us that because of the great
variations in pension plans and communal situations no one method can ac-
complish justice in every case. It is essential, therefore, that courts be able to
take advantage of reasonable alternatives and adjustments in order to accomplish
an equal distribution in an equitable manner in all situations .... Comment,
Retirement Equity Inaction: Division of Pension Benefits upon Divorce in Louis-
iana, 48 La. L. Rev. 675 (1988).
Id. at 126-27 (citations omitted). The student comment cited was also included in the
very extensive Appendix of authorities attached to the Hare opinion at 129-31.
47. Id. at 127.
48. Id. at 128.
49. Hargrave, supra note 4, at 666:
The Sims formula remains presumptively correct, and it will often be difficult
to muster the proof to show otherwise. At least when large sums are involved,
the battles of the hired experts will be costly and time-consuming, and will
probably produce no clear results. Often, the burden of proof issue will solve
the matter. When lesser amounts of money are involved, the transaction costs
and delay of proving that another formula is more equitable will often make
the issue too expensive to litigate. Equity at a general, gross level through a
general formula is simpler and cheaper. Greater equity through greater fine
tuning of a formula is possible, but at substantial costs.
Id. at 666. For a discussion of fine-tuning in an effort to achieve greater equity and its
social cost, see Glendon, supra note 9, at 1166.
50. Hargrave, supra note 4, at 666.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court suggested a choice of one of two
methods of dividing pension benefits upon divorce: (1) the present cash
value method "if the pension rights can be valued accurately and if the
marital estate includes sufficient equivalent property to satisfy the claim
of the non-employee spouse without undue hardship to the employee
spouse," '5' and (2) the fixed percentage method "when the calculation
of the present value of benefits will be too speculative." ' 51 Interestingly
enough, in Hare the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial
judge's use of the fixed percentage method in dividing the former
husband's fully matured pension benefits.53
IV. JURISPRUDENCE SINCE HARE V. HODGINS
Two cases decided by the courts of appeal concern the proper
disposition of matured pension benefits just as in Hare v. Hodgins. In
Moore v. Moore,54 the district judge had not had the benefit of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Hare"5 and had assigned a present
value to the wife's interest in the husband's pension based upon the
testimony of the husband's expert. The wife argued on appeal that the
Sims formula for calculating the present value had to be strictly applied,
resulting in a difference in value of more than $85,000.56 The husband
argued in response that to apply the Sims formula "would result in
injustice to him because his salary increased greatly between the time
of termination of the community in 1974 and the time of his retirement
in 1989." '57
In fact the husband's salary had increased from $22,619.00 to
$108,207.00. The husband's expert who had assigned a value to the
wife's interest in the pension benefits as of 1974 stated that "it would
51. Hare, 586 So. 2d at 125.
52. Id.
53. Id.
The present partition action was brought in 1988 after the former husband
retired and began to draw matured pension benefits.
The trial court in effect classified and divided the pension by using a fixed
percentage method, considering itself bound to award the wife one half of a
fixed fraction of all past and future retirement payments according to the formula
set forth in Sims v. Sims .... We see no abuse of discretion or reversible
error in the trial court's use of a fixed percentage approach, although, as we
will explain, some adjustment of the formula may be necessary in order to
prevent inequity in the present case.
54. 596 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 254.
56. "The award to the wife is $15,805.62. The wife appeals.
The wife contends the Sims formula must be rigidly applied, resulting in an award
to her of $102,281.00." Id. at 252-53.
57. Id. at 253.
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be inequitable to allow Edna [wife] to receive the full benefit of Ottis'
[husband's] salary increases after 1974." 58 After quoting at length from
the supreme court's opinion in Hare, the court of appeal reversed the
trial court judgment and remanded the case "for further proceedings
in accordance with law and the views expressed in Hare v. Hodgins.
' '5 9
Moore v. Moore appears to be an ideal case for applying the principles
enunciated in the Hare case which permit fine-tuning of the Sims formula
if the employee spouse can prove that post-termination increases in the
value of the pension rights were attributable to increases in his com-
pensation "due purely to his personal effort or skill and unrelated to
the prior community earnings." 6
There is no suggestion in the Moore opinion that the trial judge
abused his discretion by awarding the wife a lump sum (present cash
value method). The fact that the pension benefits were fully matured
and were paid to the husband in a lump sum in 1989 explains the
failure to focus on the method of division. The litigation was initiated
by a petition requesting a supplemental partition of former community
property omitted from a voluntary partition in 1974.61 Thus, the lump
sum previously received by the husband in 1989 was the only former
community asset remaining to be divided.
In a fourth circuit court of appeal case, Chiappetta v. Vallot,62 the
former husband and wife voluntarily partitioned the husband's fully
matured pension benefits, allocating forty-eight percent to the wife and
fifty-two percent to the husband. The litigation involved the division of
the survivor's benefits in the pension plan. The Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (QDRO) 63 rendered by the trial court recognized the
former wife as an alternate payee and provided that she was entitled
to ninety-six percent of the Qualified Survivor Annuity.64 The death
58. Id. at 254.
59. Id. at 256 (citations omitted).
60. Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118, 129 (La. 1991).
61. The community of acquets and gains was terminated on June 5, 1974, on
which date Edna filed a suit for separation, ending in a final divorce on April
15, 1976. At the time of the separation judgment a settlement of community
was entered into, on June 21, 1974, which makes no mention of Ottis Moore's
retirement program with Amoco.
Moore v. Moore, 596 So. 2d 252, 253 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
62. 596 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
63. See supra definition in note 33.
64. In reaching this conclusion the trial court reasoned as follows: ... The
annuity was computed at the time of the termination of the employment of
Thomas by Freeport-McMoran and, at that time, only 4% of the funds were
not community in nature. Thus, to allow Thomas' new wife to receive 52% of
that annuity while limiting Mary Ann to 48% would be an injustice and would
totally ignore Mary Ann's vested and legally recognized community interest in
her ex-husband's retirement benefit.
Chiappetta, 596 So. 2d at 849.
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benefit (survivor's annuity) was fifty percent of the pension. The former
husband appealed the QDRO. The court of appeal amended the QDRO
to provide that the former wife was entitled to forty-eight percent of
the Qualified Survivor Annuity, which was her proportionate interest in
the matured benefits.
What makes the Chiappetta case so interesting is the use of the
Retirement Equity Act, urged by the author of the student comment
mentioned above,6" to recognize the former spouse in the QDRO not
only as alternate payee, one of the two methods of an "immediate
transfer," but also as entitled to a proportionate part of the survivor's
annuity."6 The Chiappetta case evidences that recommendations in the
student comment have been accepted by at least one court. The two
decisions reveal a willingness to utilize different mechanisms for achieving
"equity" in the division of pension benefits in Louisiana. However, the
two appellate court cases discussed which were rendered subsequent to
Hare concern only matured pension benefits, admittedly a much easier
scenario in which to apply the principles established in Hare and the
recommendations of the student writer.
More recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court demonstrated its in-
tention to apply the principles articulated in Hare to unmatured pension
benefits. In Frazier v. Harper,67 the court reversed the judgment and
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions:
to receive evidence as to the contents of the pension plans
involved and generally as to the relevant issues, to the end that
the court may decide the case according to the principles set
forth in La. R.S. 9:2801 and our decisions in the present case,6"
Hare v. Hodgins; Sims v. Sims, and T.L. James & Co. Inc. v.
Montgomery.69
The issue in Frazier concerned whether the ex-wife had an interest in
the former husband's pension plan granted to him after termination of
the community as a substitute for a prior plan created during the
existence of the community. The prior plan in existence at the termination
of the community had no value, it did not vest until retirement, and
it was contingent upon factors which had not occurred. However, when
65. Beskin, supra note 8.
66. "[Clourts should provide by QDRO that an ex-wife be entitled to that portion
of the husband's survivor annuity or death benefit earned during the community as
calculated by application of the Sims formula. This approach was contemplated by Con-
gress, as REA specifically provides for recognition of a former spouse as a current spouse
for the purposes of the QJ&S and QPS annuities." Beskin, supra note 8, at 698.
67. 600 So. 2d 59 (La. 1992).
68. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
69. Id. (citations omitted).
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the new plan was substituted for the old plan, the employer gave the
former husband credit for the years served under the old plan (ap-
proximately nine). Although the lower courts had concluded that the
wife had no interest in the new pension plan, the supreme court re-
versed. 70
The implications of this decision on the principal issue are discussed
elsewhere in this symposium, 71 but the language contained in the par-
agraph on remand is a clear signal that "dicta" in Hare as to its
application to unmatured pension benefits was in fact direction. The
fifth circuit had already taken the direction in Halverson v. Halverson72
by the'time both Frazier and the denial of writs in Halverson appear
in the same volume of the Southern Reporter.
7 1
V. HALVERSON v. HAZvERSON's DMSION OF UNMATURED PENSION
BENEFITS
Hare v. Hodgins was rendered the day before Halverson74 was
submitted to the court of appeal for decision. The Halverson court
relied extensively upon the language in the Hare opinion to conclude
that the trial judge had properly ruled that the ex-wife was entitled to
begin receiving her interest in her former husband's pension plan im-
mediately through a carefully structured QDRO. The former husband's
pension plan (Delta Pilots' Retirement Plan) had not yet fully "ma-
tured," since the husband had not yet retired. 7
The former husband argued on appeal that under the Sims decision
his ex-wife was not entitled to receive her interest in his pension until
the benefits became payable. The ex-wife countered that although the
former husband had not yet retired he had "served three consecutive
years of his last ten years of employment." 76 Thus, the minimum Final
Average Earnings (FAE) could "be calculated based on those three
years . . . ,,77 The calculation of the minimum FAE in turn permitted
the calculation of the present value of her interest as if the benefits
70. See discussion of the Frazier case in this symposium at Lee Hargrave, Classification
of Assets, 53 La. L. Rev. 877 (1992).
71. Id.
72. 589 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writs denied, 600 So. 2d 655 (1992).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. At the time of trial, Mr. Halverson was fifty-three years of age; his mandatory
retirement date is October 2, 1996, when he will reach age 60. He testified he
is still employed by Delta and that he plans to retire at age 60. On the date
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were currently payable to her former husband. Not insignificantly, the
ex-wife expressed her willingness "to waive her right to prospective
higher benefits in order to receive immediate disbursement of the funds
due her." 78
The trial court had appointed its own expert, a law professor, 79 who
examined the provisions of the pension plan and concluded that it was
the appropriate case for departure from the mechanical application of
the Sims decision. Her reasons included: (1) the ex-wife's proportionate
interest in the ultimate benefits was fixed: it could not be diluted further
by the former husband's future employment; 0 (2) the former husband's
minimum actual dollar amount of his pension could be calculated,8" and
the ex-wife was willing to waive her right to future increases to receive
the benefits immediately; 2 (3) the former husband had reached the
earliest possible retirement age; 3 (4) under the REA the ex-wife could
receive her share of the pension directly from the pension administrator
even before the former husband's retirement; and (5) the QDRO could
be structured to provide that the ex-wife receive a sum no greater than
78. Id.
79. "For assistance in understanding the pension plan and in determining how the
Sims formula should be applied, the trial court appointed its own expert, Professor Dian
Arruebarrena of Loyola School of Law." Id. Professor Arruebarrena was the author of
Applying Louisiana's Community Property Principles to Pensions, 33 Loy. L. Rev. 241
(1987).
80. First, under the Delta Pilots' Retirement Plan as applied to Mr. Halverson,
the Sims formula is fixed; the denominator of the formula must be 25, because
that is the greatest number of years of service creditable under the Plan. Upon
achieving 25 years of service, Mr. Halverson became entitled to 60% of his
Final-Average Earnings upon retirement. No matter how many more years he
works that percentage figure will not increase, although the actual dollar amount
of his pension will increase if his earnings increase. Waiting until he retires will
not dilute Mrs. Peck's proportionate share, earned during their 12.055 years of
marriage.
Halverson, 589 So. 2d at 1155-56.
81. Second, because Mr. Halverson is 53, not only is he within his last ten years
of employment prior to retirement, but also an average earnings figure can be
computed for the last three years that would be the minimum for his Final-
Average Earnings under the Plan's provisions. (Because his Final-Average Earn-
ings are computed from his highest 36 months of earnings, even if his income
decreases between the time of trial and the time he retires his Final-Average
Earnings could be calculated based on the three years prior to trial.)
Id. at 1156.
82. "Fifth, distribution of Mrs. Peck's share at its present value is not unfair to
Mrs. Peck if she is willing to waive her right to future increases in order to receive the
benefits immediately." Id.
83. "Third, Mr. Halverson has attained the earliest possible retirement age and thus
is entitled to retire." Id.
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she would if she were required to wait until her former husband retired."
The immediate distribution also solved the problem of the lapse of the
ex-wife's interest in her former husband's pension should he die prior
to retirement,8" a dilemma solved in a different way in the Chiappetta
case. 16
The Halverson case is a perfect, and admittedly simple, illustration
of the proper balance of former spouses' interests in the division of
pension benefits. Virtually all of the contingencies to which the former
husband's pension benefits were subject had been accomplished. Fur-
thermore, the ex-wife, the party benefitting by immediate transfer, was
willing to forego the advantages of any remaining contingencies, in-
cluding any diminution in value of the pension to the former husband
by virtue of her early drawing of benefits.17 The immediate transfer in
the Halverson case was accomplished without assigning the entire value
of the pension to the former husband and the rest of the former
community property to the ex-wife. In the case of pension rights, the
entire value of the pension ultimately payable to the employee spouse
may in fact exceed the value of all other community property, resulting
in the employee spouse receiving no other community property from
the partition.8 8 The transfer in Halverson simply required the pension
administrator by QDRO to pay the ex-wife her interest. The division
by immediate transfer obviously was fair to the ex-wife who wanted
the present value of her interest immediately, not subject to the. con-
tingency of the husband's death prior to retirement. In summary, the
court observed: "The decision here ... insures fairness to both spouses,
in view of Mrs. Peck's willingness to accept a lesser pension than she
would receive if she waited until Mr. Halverson retires, and because
payment of her share now, in the manner explained by Arruebarrena,
will not lessen Mr. Halverson's share."
8 9
Returning to Frazier v. Harper" in an effort to predict its outcome
on remand, a similarity between the facts in Halverson and those in
Frazier is that the pension plan of the former husband was also a Delta
84. "This could be done by assessing against her share the early retirement penalty
of 3% per year for every year prior to Mr. Halverson's reaching age 60 that she begins
drawing her share of the benefits." Id.
85. "Professor Arruebarrena mentioned, in addition, that if Mrs. Peck is required
to wait for her share until Mr. Halverson retires and if he dies prior to retirement, Mrs.
Peck will receive nothing; her right to her share of his pension will lapse upon his death."
Id.
86. See supra discussion in text at notes 62-66.
87. See supra discussion in quotations in notes 80, 82.
88. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (1981), where
the author discusses the increasing importance of work-related rights as property.
89. Halverson v. Halverson, 589 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writs
denied, 600 So. 2d 655 (1992).
90. 600 So. 2d 59 (La. 1992).
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Airlines' plan. Most of the provisions of the plan discussed in the
opinion are identical to those in the Halverson case. 91 At least one
distinguishing fact is that the former husband in Frazier had not yet
completed twenty-five years of service, the maximum allowable as total
years of service for purposes of the fraction, although he was qualified
for early retirement. Without the benefit of more details concerning the
plan,92 it is not possible to distinguish further the facts in the two cases.
The one distinguishing factor already identified may not be sufficient
for the lower court to deny division by immediate transfer to the ex-
wife of her interest if such transfer is possible under the plan, especially
since the former husband is eligible for early retirement. If the ex-wife
is willing to forego any increase in ultimate benefits due to the former
husband's continued employment, as the ex-wife did in the Halverson
case, the argument for division is particularly strong.
VI. PRESENT CASH VALUE VERSUS FIXED PERCENTAGE
To refine further the terms "present cash value" and "fixed per-
centage," it is essential to define both in the context of the disposition
of the community interest in the pension at partition. If "present cash
value" is used, there ordinarily will be either immediate transfer by one
of the two methods previously described, 93 or assignment (assigning the
community interest in the pension to the employee spouse9 4). If "fixed
percentage" is used, there will be an allocation of the community interest
in the form of a judgment recognizing the percentage, ascertained or
to be ascertained, 95 of the non-employee spouse in the co-owned asset
(the pension), subject to the contingency of eventual maturity. 6
91. The new plan provided for a defined benefit of 60%/0 of the employee's
"final average compensation" comprised of the average of the highest three
consecutive years of pay in the last ten years before retirement. Retirement is
mandatory at age 60 and the plan requires twenty-five years of service for full
benefits. The second plan provides a credit for years of service under the first
plan which was ended in 1972. Using these years of service under the first plan,
Malcolm is qualified to retire early under the provisions of the second plan.
However, if Malcolm retires early, he would receive a penalty of three percent
(3%) reduction per year for each year of service less than twenty-five. In 1996,
when Malcolm attains the age of 60, he will receive full benefits under the
second pension plan.
Id. at 60-61.
92. "Documentary evidence of neither the new nor the old pension plan was intro-
duced .. " Id. at 60.
93. See supra discussion in text at notes 33-40.
94. La. R.S. 9:2801 (1991).
95. A percentage may be impossible to fix if the employee has not yet completed
his maximum years of creditable service, and as a consequence no figure can be included
in the fraction as a denominator.
96. The language of the judgment will include, as in the Sims case, if and when due
and payable.
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The "fixed percentage" method of disposition is not division of the
asset but judicial recognition of the ownership interest of the non-
employee spouse and the continuation of the co-ownership relationship
between the former spouses as to the pension. Despite pronouncements
in at least one recent court of appeal case, 97 the Louisiana Supreme
Court in both the Hare and Frazier cases continues to accept "fixed
percentage" as a method of disposition of the community interest in a
pension plan. It has surely been useful in other cases involving incor-
poreal. movable property, 98 property which is increasingly important and
which often by virtue of its inherent nature is difficult to value. Although
the author, just as the fourth circuit in the Stewart case, 99 does not
advocate in all cases continued co-ownership as the most desirable dis-
position, '°° there are some cases where "fixed percentage" may be ex-
97. Stewart v. Stewart, 585 So. 2d 1250 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writs denied, 590
So. 2d 597 (1992). The issue involved the valuation and assignment or allocation of 200
pieces of art created by the ex-wife listed for sale for three years. Because the value of
the work was speculative, the lower court adopted "fixed percentage" disposition: "The
net proceeds on the sale shall be divided equally between the parties." Id. at 1253.
On appeal, the fourth circuit reversed and remanded, directing the lower court to
appraise the art and allocate to the ex-wife. The court of appeal reasoned as follows:
"[Wle believe the intent of R.S. 9:2801 is to require the trial court to make a final
apportionment of the assets and liabilities .... In other words, the whole of R.S. 9:2801
indicates an intent to require an immediate division of the community. If community
property is not divided, this means co-ownership .... We do not believe R.S. 9:2801, by
providing for allocation of community property, is meant to be one of the exceptions to
Art. 807 ..... Id. at 1253-54 (emphasis added).
One can only speculate as to why the Louisiana Supreme Court would deny writs
in the Stewart case after recognizing co-ownership as a possibility for pension benefits in
the Hare case.
But see Reeves v. Reeves, 607 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
98. See, e.g., Michel v. Michel, 484 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (wife's
books and manuscripts); Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977) (husband attorney's
contingent fee contracts); Reeves, 607 So. 2d 626 (mineral interests).
Interestingly enough, the same disposition will be made of a former spouse's weekly
workers compensation payments in which the former community has an interest under
La. Civ. Code art. 2344.
One possible distinguishing factor between these cases and the Stewart case is that
in the latter the assets are corporeal and from the facts given possibly not subject to one
spouse's exclusive control. See quotation from the Stewart case in infra note 99.
99. Stewart, 585 So. 2d at 1254: "There are good practical reasons why the community
should be divided with finality .... If the former spouses remain co-owners, who decides
what price to charge for the art? Or what gallery will display it? Or when to accept an
offer? These questions only illustrate that when the trial court requires co-ownership over
the objection of one of the spouses, future disputes are not only likely, they are a
certainty, and this means future litigation."
100. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 23, at § 7.19 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Katherine Shaw
Spaht, Post-Dissolution Management of Former Community Property: An Unresolved
Problem, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 705 (1990); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes,
Developments in the Law, 1988-1989, 50 La. L. Rev. 293 (1989); Katherine Shaw Spaht,
Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in the Law, 1989-1990, 51 La. L. Rev. 321 (1990).
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tremely useful and the only way to properly protect the legitimate
interests of the employee spouse. To avoid potential abuse by the em-
ployee spouse who is the manager of the co-owned interests in pension
benefits, the trial judge should impose a duty of "good faith"' 0° upon
the employee spouse in the judgment, a remedy envisioned by Justice
Tate in the Sims decision. 02
Unbridled enthusiasm for "present cash value" division of the com-
munity interest in unmatured pension benefits is simply not justified. 03
It does represent long needed modifications in the rigidly applied "fixed
percentage" method of the Sims decision. Too often the court failed
to weigh the interests of the non-employee spouse, including the ad-
vantages of immediate payment in the form of a distribution from the
pension fund or other community property,1"4 or a separate account
managed by the non-employee spouse, and, in appropriate cases, freedom
from the conditions burdening the employee's interest. The Louisiana
Legislature and Congress did act to alleviate the obstacles to serious
consideration of "present cash value" and to assure that the interests
of the non-employee spouse would be thoroughly considered.
However, the adoption of "present cash value" division of un-
matured pension benefits in virtually every case might well ignore equally
vital interests of the employee spouse.10 s Such interests include assuring
that the employee's ultimate benefits are not affected by the "present
cash value" division and that the value or ultimate payment of the
pension benefits is as certain as possible. To protect the latter interest
of the employee requires that most, if not virtually all, of the contin-
gencies to which payment of the benefits are subject have been fulfilled
or resolved. A trial court should proceed cautiously and deliberately in
examining the provisions of a particular plan when selecting "present
cash value" division or "fixed percentage" by judgment as a disposition
of unmatured pension benefits.
101. Compare the obligation of "good faith" to the obligation of a co-owner not to
cause damage to the thing held in indivision by his fault. For a thorough discussion of
the comparison, see Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 23, at § 7.19 (Supp. 1992).
An example of a former spouse managing co-owned pension benefits is Frazier v.
Harper, 600 So. 2d 59 (La. 1992), where the husband agreed to a substitution of one
pension plan for another. See discussion in text supra at notes 90-92 and elsewhere in
this symposium at Hargrave, supra note 70.
102. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 923 n.4 (La. 1978).
103. It is obvious that the author does not share the enthusiasm of the student who
wrote Retirement Equity Inaction: Division of Pension Benefits Upon Divorce in Louisiana,
48 La. L. Rev. 677 (1988). Nonetheless, the article was an excellent piece of work which
obviously influenced the judiciary and assisted in educating the author.
104. La. R.S. 9:2801 (1991).
105. See, e.g., supra discussion in note 41.
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